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ABSTRACT
Metamorphic Detection Using Singular Value Decomposition
by Ranjith Kumar Jidigam
Metamorphic malware changes its internal structure with each infection, while
maintaining its original functionality. Such malware can be difficult to detect using
static techniques, since there may be no common signature across infections. In
this research we apply a score based on Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) to
the problem of metamorphic detection. SVD is a linear algebraic technique which is
applicable to a wide range of problems, including facial recognition. Previous research
has shown that a similar facial recognition technique yields good results when applied
to metamorphic malware detection. We present experimental results and we analyze
the effectiveness and efficiency of this SVD-based approach.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Malware is a major threat to the cyber space. It is estimated that annually the
losses incurred by computer malware is $114 billion worldwide [17]. With the ad-
vancement in technology, usage of gadgets etc., malware attacks have been increasing
rapidly. Malware is a piece of software payload that injects in to the host file causing
denial of service, stealing confidential information etc.,. With the generation of new
malware everyday there is a mandate need for efficient detection techniques [11].
Metamorphic malware mutates so that every infection is different. Different
morphing techniques like garbage code insertion, register swap, instruction reordering
etc., are implemented to generate malware to achieve code obfuscation. Malware
writers have become so intelligent in morphing malware that is hard to detect. Many
reasons like software bugs, unawarness among naive internet users etc., are few reasons
that provide entry points for malware into the cyber space [10].
The base for this paper is from a facial recognition technique Eigenfaces [29].
In this paper we have extended the previous work done on malware detection using
eigenvalue analysis technique [22]. We modified the implementation by using Singular
Value Decomposition (SVD) [13, 24]. SVD is applied on highly metamorphic malware
families that have evaded detection by statistical approaches. In this technique we
pre-processed the malware executables to extract the raw bytes from the text section.
Then we implemented SVD to determine the singular space which represents the cor-
relation among the malware files. Malware test dataset and benign files are projected
on to this space to determine if they are close to the training malware dataset. We
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have done experiments on highly metamorphic malware and got good results.
The paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes about malware genera-
tion, different types of malware and malware detection techniques. Chapter 3 tells
about the eigenfaces and eigenvectors in facial recognition. Implementation of SVD
technique on metamorphic malware is described in Chapter 4. Test setup, software
and hardware requirements and JAMA(Java Matrix) API are briefed in Chapter 5.
Chapter 6 shows the experimental results and conclusion in Chapter 7.
2
CHAPTER 2
Malware
In this chapter we provide a brief background information that is relevant to the
technique implemented. First we begin with malware morphing techniques and then
about malware types.
2.1 Metamorphic Techniques
Malware is generated by performing swapping, insertion, substitution operations
on assembly code instructions. The amount of morphing determines the strength of
the malware. Following is the description of morphing techniques.
2.1.1 Garbage Code and Dead Code
Garbage code does not have any functionality. It is called as do nothing code.
The program functionality does not change with garbage code insertion. For example
the instruction NOP does not have any functionality. On the other hand dead code
is the code which is never reached. Both these morphing strategies can be used to
defend against signature based detection approaches and are effective defenses against
statistical based detection techniques [7].
2.1.2 Instruction Substitution
In this morphing technique an instruction is replaced with its equivalent instruc-
tion by keeping the functionality the same. Registers are used interchangeably in this
technique [32]. This acts as a strong defense against signature based detection and is
used in metamorphic generators.
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2.1.3 Instruction Reordering
As the name suggests this technique works by shuffling the blocks and modules
in an malware executable to generate a new infection. Inserting jump instructions
in between modules by keeping the functionality the same is the main process im-
plemented in this. As the blocks are shuffled this technique is an effective defense
against signature based detection strategies [7] and also against structural detection
approaches [25].
2.1.4 Register Swapping
In register swapping technique the virus instruction operands are stored in dif-
ferent registers for each new infection. Wildcard pattern matching would detect this
technique.
2.1.5 Host Code Mutation
Some malware infections like Win95/Bistro morph their code as well as the orig-
inal code of host file into which they are inserted [15]. It is too difficult to implement
this technique. As the host code itself mutates it is hard to detect this malware.
2.2 Metamorphic Malware
Malware is generated to achieve code obfuscation. We mentioned different mal-
ware generation techniques in previous section. We describe about different malware
families [3] in this section.
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2.2.1 G2
G2 malware family is called as second generation malware. It is modestly meta-
morphic malware [31]. It is generated by using instruction substitution morphing
technique.
2.2.2 MPCGEN
Mass produced code generation kit malware family is mild. When compared with
randomly selected benign code this malware family exhibits more similarity between
each infection [4, 31].
2.2.3 NGVCK
The next generation virus construction kit uses garbage code insertion, register
swapping, code reordering techniques to generate sufficiently morphed malware [30].
This malware is written in visual basic and it generates 32 bit executable files. This
malware family evades signature based detection techniques but can be detected using
statistical approach [21, 28, 31].
2.2.4 MWOR
For research purposes MWOR malware has been created. Morphing engine is
present along with the worm. Morphing is done by instruction substitution and
garbage code insertion. The morphing is on par with NGVCK and hence this worm
evades signature based detection. The flexibility with this worm is user can specify
the level of morphing and dead code from non-virus files is inserted. Morphed code
is indistinguishable from benign code at sufficient padding ratio causing statistical
detection techniques to fail [26]. For the experiments we used malware with padding
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ration ranging from 0.5 to 4.0. Padding ratio 0.5 represents that dead code equivalent
to 50% of the actual worm size has been inserted. High padding ratios implements
that more code from linux benign files has been inserted in to the virus replicate.
2.3 Malware Detection Techniques
A number of malware detection techniques [11, 16] have been proposed in the
recent past but with the growth in the number of cyber security attacks there is a
mandate need for fast and efficient malware detection techniques.
The paper tells about current malware detection techniques. Based on the com-
parison between different detection techniques and the problems with these techniques
in identifying modern malware the paper proposed the need for new malware detction
techniques. Malware is detected using following approaches.
2.3.1 Signature scanning and heuristics
Few malware families are generated just by instruction swapping or instruction
substitution methods, such malware can be detected by just looking for a common
signature. Sometimes heuristics can be applied to detect poorly morphed malware.
2.3.2 Machine Learning
Machine Learning is implemented across a lot of domains in computer industry.
For malware detection Hidden Markov Model (HMM) [2, 20, 26, 27] is a famous
technique that is used to learn about the malware data and result some information.
Opcode sequences of malware executable are trained using HMM. The trained HMM
is then used to score malware test and benign files. The highly morphed virus family
NGVCK are easily detected using this HMM technique.
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2.3.3 n-gram Analysis
In n-gram Analysis technique overlapping sequence of n bytes of malware exe-
cutable is considered and frequency table is generated [31]. Benign and virus files are
evaluated to calculate frequencies of overlapping bytes and then is scored against the
frequency table built for malware family files. This technique also detects NGVCK
malware effectively.
2.3.4 Code Disassembling
A malware file is diassembled and is analyzed to identify the garbage instructions.
This model when used with Hidden Markov Model gives efficient results.
2.3.5 Code Emulation
Virus files are executed in a Virtual Machine. The exectuion is carefully moni-
tored to identify the virus payload.
2.3.6 Opcode Graph Analysis
Graphs are constructed for opcode digraph frequencies. Then a test file frequen-
cies are compared against this trained frequencies. A detailed experiment is given in
paper [21]. This technique detects MWOR metamorphic worms effectively.
2.3.7 Simple Substitution
An experiment using simple substitution is analyzed in paper [23]. In this, all
the opcode digraph statistics of malware family are gathered and when we want to
classify a file, we collect its opcodes and then simple substitution attack is applied
with the malware family statistics as language statistics. A high score implies that
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the file can be transformed using language statistics to match a malware family file.
2.3.8 Structural Entropy
Wavelet analysis is used to segment files based on varying entropy levels. These
segments are then compared used Levenshtein distance to computer a score. This
technique is not costly as it is applied on binary files. The technique is more analyzed
in paper [5, 25]. The results shows that MWOR worms are detected correctly.
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CHAPTER 3
Singular Value Decomposition and Eigenface
A facial recognition technique Eigenfaces for recognition is the basis for this
implementaion. Similar technique is implemented on the malware files to identify the
correlation between the same.
Facial recognition is an important field of study as it has applications across
various domains like detecting criminals, digital animation, identifying the owner of
the gadgets, identifying the employees etc., Face recognition is a challenging task as
there are many features to consider like ear, nose, eyes etc., Also external features
like light focus in the image, different face expressions of the person, difference in age
etc., are also few challenging things to determine the relation among the images. All
the features in a face are represented in three dimensional vectors and it is hard to
implement the recognition technique. But a flat upright image is represented in two
dimensional vector (pixel values). This consideration helps in implementing facial
recognition and also to get accurate results.
A facial image can be decomposed further into small characteristic feature images
called eigenfaces. These eigenfaces represent the significant features of the image. The
space spanned by these eigenfaces is called facespace. When a new image has to be
tested to see if it resembles any of the trained facial image, it is projected on to this
face space and a score is calculated to determine how relavant the test image is to the
trained facial image. This technique is a kind of clustering technique which depicts
the relation among the input images.
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3.1 Eigenvalues and Eigenvectors
Eigen means unique or belonging [9]. Eigenvectors are also called as characteristic
vectors. In linear algebra, if a non-zero vector 𝑥 satisfies the following equation for a
square matrix 𝐴, then 𝑥 is called an eigenvector of 𝐴 and 𝜆 is called the eigenvalue
associated with the eigenvector 𝑥. The equation
𝐴𝑥 = 𝜆𝑥
represents the eigenvector 𝑥 and 𝜆 , the eigenvalue is a scalar.
Figure 1: Eigenvalue and Eigenvector
Eigenvector and Eigenvalue are represented in the Figure 1. Matrix 𝐴 contains
data points of 𝑛 files aligned in 𝑛 columns. The variation among all these data
points is represented by covariance matrix. Eigenvectors helps in quantifying the
similarity between the various data points. So eigenvectors and eigenvalues for this
covariance matrix are calculated and when these eigenvectors are projected into space
they enclose an area called as eigenspace. More the eigenvalue, more important is its
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corresponding eigenvector in contributing to the variance among the data points of
𝑛 files. In facial recognition technique these 𝑛 files corresponds to 𝑛 different images
and data points represents the pixel values.
3.2 Image Detection
In the image detection technique eigenvectors of the covariance matrix are de-
termined [8]. These eigenvectors when projected into the space they enclose an area
called face space. When we project a known image on to this face space we can re-
construct the original image in terms of eigenvectors associated with weights. Not all
eigenvectors contributes to the original image. In facial recognition technique after
constructing a column vector with pixels of each image we subtract the mean pixel
value all the training input images at that position from the actual pixel value of all
the images. Figure 2 represents the original face images and their ghost images in
Figure 3 when projected on to this face space.
Figure 2: Original Images
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Figure 2 contains the original face images that are used for training. The equiv-
alent eigenfaces are represented in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Eigenfaces of the Original Images
Each eigenvector has corresponding weight associated with it. When we sum
up all the eigenvectors along with their weights we can reconstruct the original im-
age. An image 𝑀 containing 𝑚 × 𝑛 pixels can be represented as a vector 𝑉 . Let
𝐸1, 𝐸2, 𝐸3, . . . , 𝐸𝑛 are the eigenvectors constructed from a set of images where image
𝑀 is one among them. Now when we project vector 𝑉 on to this facespace con-
structed by 𝐸1, 𝐸2, 𝐸3, . . . , 𝐸𝑛 we can construct the original image. Now the sum of
eigenvectors and their corresponding weights gives the vector
𝑉 = 𝑤1𝐸1 + 𝑤2𝐸2 + 𝑤3𝐸3 + . . . + 𝑤𝑛𝐸𝑛
where 𝑤1, 𝑤2, 𝑤3, . . . , 𝑤𝑛 represents the weights associated with the eigenvectors
𝐸1, 𝐸2, 𝐸3, . . . , 𝐸𝑛. Weights of known and unknown images are compared against
these weights to determine if it is close to the training dataset images.
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When a known image is projected on to the eigenspace we can reconstruct the
original image and when an unknown image is projected on to the eigenspace we
cannot construct the original image. The Figure 4 represents the projection of known
and unknown images on to the eigenspace. This Figure 4 is taken from CMU PIE
database of images.
Figure 4: Projection of known and unknown images into the eigenspace
3.3 Singular Value Decomposition
Singular Value Decomposition [24] is a factorization of a real matrix. The basic
idea behind SVD is taking high variable set of data points and reducing it to a lower
dimensions set that better exposes the substructure of the original data more clearly
by ordering the lower dimensional data from most variance to the least. SVD of a
real 𝑚*𝑛 matrix 𝐴 is a factorization of the form
𝐴 = 𝑈𝑆𝑉 𝑇
Matrix 𝑈 contains left singular vectors of 𝐴 which are generated by calculating the
eigenvectors of 𝐴𝐴𝑇 . Matrix 𝑉 contains right singular vectors of 𝐴, generated by
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calculating eigenvectors of 𝐴𝑇𝐴. Matrix 𝑆 is a diagonal matrix with square root of
eigenvalues common to the matrices 𝑈 and 𝑉 . 𝑈𝑈𝑇 and 𝑉 𝑇𝑉 are identity matrices.
Here the eigenvectors of the matrix 𝑈 are normalized by dividing each eigenvector
with square root of its corresponding eigenvalue. That is why the eigenvectors of the
matrix 𝑈 are called as singularvectors.
The matrix 𝑈 contains eigenvectors sorted according to the singular values in the
matrix 𝐴. Figure 5 represents the Singular Value Decomposition on a 𝑚× 𝑛 matrix
𝐴.
𝜎1
𝜎2
𝜎1
𝜎2
𝑀
𝑆
𝑉 𝑇 𝑈
Figure 5: Matrix transformation using SVD
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CHAPTER 4
Singular Value Decomposition for Malware
We discussed about Singular Value Decomposition and its implementation in
Image Recognition in the previous Chapter 3. Similar technique was implemented in
the paper Eigenviruses [12]. This serves as the basis for our implementation. In this
Chapter we describe about the SVD algorithm implemented in training and testing
malware files. The goal of the training phase is to determine the weights of the
training input files by projecting them on to the eigenspace. In the testing phase
we project the virus and benign test files on to this eigenspace to determine their
weights and then calculate the euclidean distance between the weights of the training
files and test files.
SVD is represented as 𝐴 = 𝑈𝑆𝑉 𝑇 . Eigenspace is determined by projecting the
eigenvectors of the covariance matrix 𝐴𝐴𝑇 , which are represented by the matrix 𝑈 .
Matrix 𝑆 is a diagonal matrix with square root of eigenvalues common to the matrices
𝑈 and 𝑉 . We are considering singular vectors of the matrix 𝑈 for calculating the
weights of training and testing files.
4.1 Algorithm
The training and testing phases follow a step by step process. The algorithm
implemented in these phases is described below.
4.1.1 Training Phase
In the training phase first extract the raw bytes from the text or code sections
of all the input training files and construct a column vector for each file. Then deter-
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mine the eigenvectors of the covariance matrix. These covariance matrix eigenvectors
represents the eigenspace. We do not consider all the eigenvectors for generating the
eigenspace as vectors with low eigenvalue are less important. Then we project each
input training file on to this eigenspace to get set of weights. Implementation of this
phase is explained below.
1. Acquire a set of 𝑀 virus replicates of a particular malware family
2. Extract raw bytes from the text or code section of each virus replicate
3. Construct a matrix 𝐴 = [Φ1,Φ2,Φ3, . . . ,Φ𝑀 ] with vectors where each vector
represents the raw bytes of a particular virus replicate arranged in a column.
Let us say that the maximum number of bytes in a particular replicate among all
replicates are 𝑁 , then the number of rows in matrix 𝐴 will be 𝑁 . Append zeros
to other columns which has less than 𝑁 bytes. In case of image recognition we
subtract the mean image (obtained by taking average of pixel values of all the
training images) from each image vector. However in case of malware detection
we are ignoring this as subtracting byte values does not make any sense.
4. Now in order to identify the variance between different malware replicates find
the eigenvectors of the covariance matrix 𝐶.
𝐶 =
1
𝑀
𝑀∑︁
𝑖=1
Φ𝑖Φ𝑖
𝑇 (1)
= 𝐴𝐴𝑇
where 𝑀 = number of files
5. Matrix 𝐴 dimensions are 𝑁 × 𝑀 . Covariance matrix 𝐶 dimensions will be
𝑁 × 𝑁 . Finding eigenvectors for such a big matrix is not feasible with the
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general computing power and moreover all the eigenvectors are not important.
So alternatively we can calculate eigenvectors from another matrix 𝐿 which is
generated from 𝐴𝑇𝐴. The dimensions of 𝐿 are𝑀×𝑀 . Let 𝜈𝑖 be the eigenvector
of the matrix 𝐿. Then the following equation gives the eigenvectors of the matrix
𝐿.
𝐿𝑣𝑖 = 𝜆𝑖𝑣𝑖 (2)
𝐴𝑇𝐴𝑣𝑖 = 𝜆𝑖𝑣𝑖
where 𝜆𝑖 is the eigenvalue.
Multiplying both sides of the above equation with 𝐴 gives us the eigenvectors
of the covariance matrix 𝐶.
𝐴𝐴𝑇𝐴𝑣𝑖 = 𝜆𝑖𝐴𝑣𝑖 (3)
𝑖.𝑒., 𝐶𝐴𝑣𝑖 = 𝜆𝑖𝐴𝑣𝑖
𝐴𝑣𝑖 is the eigenvector of the covariance matrix 𝐶. If 𝑣 is the set of eigenvectors
of 𝐿 then 𝐴𝑣 is the set of eigenvectors of 𝐶. where 𝑣 = 𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑖.
This reduced output of covariance matrix is called as Reduced Singular Value
Decomposition. Therefore the multiplication of matrix 𝐴 with the eigenvectors
matrix 𝑣 gives the eigenvectors of covariance matrix 𝐶. We can represent it
as 𝑢=𝐴𝑣. The eigenvectors in the matrix 𝑢 are normalized by dividing each
eigenvector with square root of its corresponding eigenvalue.
6. Sort the eigenvectors 𝑢 according to their associated eigenvalue in descending
order. The higher the eigenvalue the more important is its corresponding eigen-
vector.
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7. We consider only 𝑀 ‘ eigenvectors out of 𝑀 , where 𝑀 ‘ < 𝑀 . We project these
eigenvectors in to the space and the space spanned by these vectors is called
eigenspace. As eigenvectors with small eigenvalue does not contribute much
to the eigenspace. We determine the value of 𝑀 ‘ heuristically by conducting
experiments for different value of 𝑀 ‘.
8. We can construct the original virus replicate from these𝑀 ‘ vectors when added
with their corresponding weights. Lets us say for a virus file “𝜑” in the training
set with eigenvectors 𝑢1, 𝑢2, 𝑢3, . . . , 𝑢𝑛 we can get back the virus files as below
𝜑 = 𝑤1 * 𝑢1 + 𝑤2 * 𝑢2 + . . . + 𝑤𝑀 ‘ * 𝑢𝑀 ‘ (4)
𝜑 =
𝑀 ‘∑︁
𝑖=1
𝑤𝑖𝑢𝑖 (5)
where 𝑀 ‘ represents important eigenvectors.
Then we can determine weights of a particular virus replicate ’𝜑’ as follows
𝑤𝑖 =
𝑀 ‘∑︁
𝑖=1
𝑢𝑖
𝑇𝜑 (6)
We represent the set of weights of a virus replicate 𝜑𝑖 as
Ω𝑇𝑖 = [𝑤1, 𝑤2, . . . , 𝑤𝑀 ‘] (7)
Similarly we project all the training dataset virus replicates on to this eigenspace
and determine their corresponding weight vectors.
9. The weights of all the virus replicates together are represented as ∆.
∆ = [Ω1,Ω2, . . . ,Ω𝑀 ‘] (8)
The set of weights of all the virus replicates after projecting them on to the eigenspace
is the output of training phase.
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4.1.2 Testing Phase
In this phase we construct a column vector for each test file and project on to
this eigenspace generated in the previous section. For training phase any file with
total bytes less than 𝑁 is appended with zeros and files with bytes more than 𝑁 bytes
are chopped off from the bottom to make the column vector size to 𝑁 rows. Once we
determine the weights of test file we compare these weights against weight vector of
each virus replicate generated in the training phase. We calculate euclidean distance
between these weight vectors. If the test file is close to the training data set virus
replicates then we get a score below the predetermined threshold score. Here are the
steps in the training phase
1. Project the test file 𝜑𝑛 on to the eigenspace or singularspace to determine its
weights.
𝑤𝑖 =
𝑀∑︁
𝑖=1
𝑢𝑖
𝑇𝜑𝑛
Ω𝑇𝑛 = [𝑤1, 𝑤2, . . . , 𝑤𝑀 ‘] (9)
2. Now calculate the euclidean distance between this vector Ω𝑛 and weight vectors
generated in the training phase. If Ω𝑖 is the weight vector of a training file then
the euclidean distance is calculated as below.
𝜖𝑖 =
√︁
(𝜔21 − 𝜌21) + (𝜔22 − 𝜌22) + . . . + (𝜔2𝑀 − 𝜌2𝑀)
where 𝜔 represents weights of the training files and 𝜌 represents weights of test
replicate.
3. First, few virus replicates that are close to the training data set are tested
to determine a threshold score. Then we test benign files by calculating the
euclidean score and checking if is below or above the threshold.
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CHAPTER 5
Implementation
In this chapter we describe about preprocessing the input files that includes
extracting raw bytes from the text or code section, diagramatic representation of the
technique, the environment set up and JAMA linear algebra library.
5.1 Extract Raw Bytes
The code or text section code contains the actual application logic in any ex-
ecutable file. In case of malware replicates this is the place where virus payload
instructions are present. So we extract text section bytes and then construct our
input training matrix. The number of bytes varies across the different malware fami-
lies and also benign files. We converted these byte values to their equivalent decimal
values and constructed the input training matrix as SVD can be implemented only
on integer or float data points. The Singular Vectors are already normalized in the
actual implementation of SVD.
Figure 6 represents the code section instructions of a highly morphed malware
replicate NGVCK. We can clearly see that the middle colum represents the byte values
of the correpsonding instructions in the third column. We constructed a column vector
for each malware replicate by arranging the byte values in a sequnce. For example in
the Figure 6 the sequence of bytes in the input training vector is c1, e0, 1e, e8,
00 and so on. Corresponding decimal values of thes bytes are inserted into the input
matrix while implementing the SVD.
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Figure 6: Text Section Bytes
5.2 Pictorial Representation of Technique
We extract raw bytes from the text section of all the training set malware files
and construct a training input matrix 𝐴 [19]. If there are 𝑀 training files and the
maximum number of bytes among all the files is 𝑁 then the matrix 𝐴 dimensions
are 𝑁 *𝑀 . We then pass this huge matrix to the JAMA API developed for Java to
calculate the Singular Values and Singular Vectors of the covariance matrix. Once we
obtain the Singular Vectors we calculate the weights of the training files by projecting
them on to the singular space generated.
Similarly we project test files on to the singular space and determine their
weights. Then we compute the euclidean distance between the weights of each test
file and weights of all the training files. Here is the diagramatic representation of the
whole process
21
Figure 7: Implementation
It is obvious from the Figure 7 that raw bytes are extracted from both test
and train files. To generate eigenvalues and vectors we consider bytes from only
the train files. Once these eigenvectors are determined the test and train files are
projected on to this space to determine their weights between which euclidean distance
is computed. First we test malware files agains this training dataset and we then
determine a threshold. Later we calculate euclidean scores for benign files. Ideally
the values for benign files should be above this threshold score.
It is not very easy to find the test files with exact size of the training files. So
instead we considered files with more instruction bytes and then chopped off the bytes
from the end. For the smaller files with less instructions we append zeroes. We tested
files with more bytes than the maximum number of bytes in the input training files.
5.3 Environment Setup
We carried experiments on the below Hardware and Software.
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Table 1: Software and Hardware configuration
Type Description
Operating System Windows 7
Processor Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3210M
RAM 6.00 GB
Java Version 6
JAMA API for linear Algebra
In general it is not feasible to calculate the singular vectors for all the input
training vectors as the covariance matrix is huge. Instead we calculate the eigenvec-
tors for the reduced covariance matrix and then calculate singular vectors. Detailed
implementation of this is explained in previous Chapter 3. SVD technique is imple-
mented on the configuration in Table 1. The technique is quick enough in calculating
the scores.
5.4 JAMA Library
JAMA [14] stands for Java Matrix. It is a linear algebra package that is devel-
oped by National Institute of Standards and Technology(NIST). Modules in this API
calculates the eigenvalues and eigenvectors as accurately as Matlab. Using this API
we can solve complex matrix operations quickly. We used Jama-1.0.3.jar file for Java
in calculating the singular values and vectors.
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CHAPTER 6
Experimental Results
We carried our testing on different malware families and benign files as listed in
Tables 2 and 3. We used the malware files efficiently by performing five fold cross
technique i.e., by randomly shuffling the malware train and test datasets. For all
the rounds we used 80% files for training and remaining 20% files for testing. For
all the five folds the train and test files differs but the benign test files remain same.
Table 2 tells about the number of virus replicates that are used for training and
testing purposes.
Table 2: Malware Datasets
Malware Family Operating System Total Files Training Testing
MWOR Linux 700 560 140
NGVCK Windows 50 40 10
G2 Windows 50 10 40
There are windows and linux based malware families in our training datasets.
G2 malwar families are less morphed when compared with MWOR and NGVCK
so we noticed that the technique could find better correlation between the data
points for just ten training files in case of G2. The results section for G2 justifies
this assumption. If the malware files are highly morphed then we consider more
replicates of that malware family for training phase. For the benign test files we took
files from both the operating systems and tested them against the type of malware.
Table 3 describes the number of windows and linux files used for testing.
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Table 3: Benign Datasets
Bengin Family Operating System Total Files
Ubuntu Linux 20
Cygwin Windows 30
6.1 Results
Following sub-sections shows the scores obtained for malware and benign files
against the training dataset. These scores are obtained by calculating the euclidean
distance between weights of the test files and train files after projecting them on to
eigenspace.
6.1.1 MWOR
MWOR is highly metamorphic malware generated in a academic thesis [26].
The paper tells about experiments carried out in generating different padding ratio
malware datasets. This malware replicates are linux based. The padding ratio at
the end indicates that the percentage of dead code that has been inserted in to the
malware replicates. For example MWOR_0.5 indicates that 50% of dead code has
been inserted into the malware replicate, MWOR_4.0 says that 400% of malware
replicates has dead code. This dead code is taken from 20 linux benign files.
From the experiments carried out on all the padding ratios we observed that a
proper threshold can be set for the scores obtained for padding ratios upto 2.0. For
padding ratios after 2.0, it is little hard to obtain a clear threshold between benign
and malware test dataset scores. The reason for this is as the padding ratio increases
most of the instructions in the malware replicates matches the instrutions in the
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benign linux files.
Figure 8 represents the scores obtained for MWOR_1.0 virus replicates against
the linux files.
Figure 8: Scatter Plot for MWOR_1.0
From the Figure 9 we can interpret that all the malware and benign files are
classified properly. The AUC and ROC values mentioned in the below sections tells
more about the false and true positives obtained for this dataset.
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Figure 9: Scatter Plot for MWOR_1.5
The scatter plot for the MWO_1.5 also gives a proper threshold. We can clearly
distinguish the scores of the benign linux files and malware replicate files. Out of the
20 files we tested against this padding ratio files we observed 0% false positives and
0% false positives. Scores for MWOR_2.0 are represented in the Figure 10. We could
see that there are few false positives as the padding ratio increases.
Figure 10: Scatter Plot for MWOR_2.0
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Figures 11, 12 represents the scores for malware families MWOR_2.5 and
MWOR_3.0. We observe that the few benign file scores are merging with the train
files. The scores for few benign files are coming down because of the more number of
matching instructions of malware and benign files as padding ration increased. This
tells that the similarity between the files increases as the padding ratio increased. We
noticed the scores for the benign files dropped as the padding ratio increased.
Figure 11: Scatter Plot for MWOR_2.5
Figure 12: Scatter Plot for MWOR_3.0
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From the scores for MWOR_4.0 in the Figure 13 we observe that there are false
positivies identified in this set. The reason as said earlier more padding ratio indicates
that more instructions match between malware and benign files.
Figure 13: Scatter Plot for MWOR_4.0
Another reason for false positives would be presence of noise in the train files.
An explanation for possibility of noise in the files and the scores drop is given in the
link [1].
For all the above experiments we considered only first singular vector. We pro-
jected this singular vector into the space and then determined the weights for malware
and test files. The reason we considered only one singular value is because the other
singular values are very small when compared with the first singular value. So we
ignored singular vectors with small singular value comparative to first singular value
considering that they are not important in contributing to the Eigenspace.
The scores obtained for different Singular Values are further explained in the
ROC section.
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6.1.2 NGVCK
NGVCK is highly morphed malware. These virus replicates run on windows
platform. Cygwin files are scored against this malware family. Figure 14 represents
the scores for the NGVCK family. We considered only one singular value and its
corresponding vector in calculating the euclidean score between the test and training
datasets.
From the Figure 14 we observe that there are false negatives. It is little hard to
set a proper threshold between benign and malware scores. But still the results are
good as NGVCK is highly morphed.
Figure 14: Scatter Plot for NGVCK
In the NGVCK dataset there are few malware replicates with more number of
instructions and these are highly morphed. Most of those byte instructions are NOP.
We included these files in our training datasets. Most of the benign files are classified
properly. There are few malware replicates for which the scores are almost above the
scores of the benign files. But still the technique could seperate the malware and
benign scores.
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6.1.3 G2
G2 virus replicates run on windows. We tested cygwin files against this family
and the Figure 15 represents the scores obtained.
Figure 15: Scatter Plot for G2
From the Figure 15 we can clearly separate the malware and benign scores. G2
is less morphed when compared with rest of the malware families described above. In
case of G2 for the training phase we considered only 10 files and the technique indeed
showed better results. We achieved 0% false positives.
6.2 Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curves
ROC curve is a graphical plot which helps in determining the accuracy of the
test. It is a plot between true positive rate and false positive rate. ROC curves are
used in signal detection systems, medical field etc., The accuracy of the test depends
on how well the true positives are differentiated from false positivies. When an ROC
curve is drawn an area is enclosed and it is called as Area Under Curve (AUC). AUC
value 1 represents that there is a perfect separation of true positivies and and false
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positives by the test. We calculate ROC curves for different malware families scores
discussed above.
Also in our tests we performed experiments by considering 1, 2 and 3 singular
vectors. We observed that considering only first singular vector with highest singular
value gives efficient results than considering first two and three Singular Vectors.
We have shown the AUC trend for the different Singular Vectors considered in our
experiment.
Table 4 displays the AUC values for the G2 and NGVCK malware families when
only first singular vector is considered in generating the eigenspace. The AUC for
these two families shows that the malware and benign files are identified correctly with
the SVD technique. In case of the G2 virus family 0% false positives are identified.
In case of NGVCK there are few false positives.
Table 4: NGVCK and G2 AUC
Malware AUC Average AUC of all five sets
NGVCK 0.94552 0.91415
G2 1 0.98828
In case of MWOR there are different padding ratios ranging from 0.5 till 4.0. We
mentioned AUC values for the entire MWOR family in Table 5. As said earlier we
implemented five fold cross technique on this datasets. In MWOR there are different
padding ratios, so in each padding ratio we mentioned the best set ROC value and
also the average value for the entire padding ratio.
Almost all the padding ratios has AUC value near to 1 which tells that MWOR
families are detected properly using SVD technique. Figures 17, 18 represents the
AUC value for MWOR families with different padding ratios. We could see a drop in
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Table 5: MWOR AUC values
Malware AUC Average AUC of all five sets
MWOR_1.0 1 0.99998
MWOR_1.5 1 0.999976
MWOR_2.0 0.99883 0.997464
MWOR_2.5 0.99890 0.9966
MWOR_3.0 0.99713 0.9935
MWOR_4.0 0.98803 0.98336
the AUC value as we move to higher padding ratios.
Figure 16: ROC for Mwor_1.0
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Figure 17: ROC for Mwor_3.0
Figure 18: ROC for Mwor_4.0
For MWOR_1.0 malware family the AUC value is 1. It means that there is a
proper separation between false and true positives. But as the padding ratio increased
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the AUC value decreased by a small fraction which indicates that there are few false
positives. The average values of all the five folds is the best approximation score for
the different mwor families.
Figure 19 represents the NGVCK malware family ROC curve. The AUC value
in this case is 0.94552. NGVCK is highly morphed malware yet the technique shown
good results with few false positives identified.
Figure 19: ROC for NGVCK
We also did experiments by considering first two and three singular vectors
though there is a huge difference in their singular values when compared with the
first singular value. In case of NGVCK we observed that there is a drop in the AUC
value. Figure 20 represents the ROC curve for NGVCK family for two and three
singular vectors used in generating the Eigenspace.
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Figure 20: ROC for NGVCK
The trend in scores for NGVCK families for 2 and 3 eigenvectors is better when
compared with scores for MWOR and G2. We noticed that the scores for two and
three eigenvectors in case of NGVCK are good. G2 is less morphed when compared
with NGVCK and MWOR. The AUC value when one singular vector considered in
generating the eigenspace is 1. Figure 21 represents the ROC curve for G2 family.
Figure 21: ROC for G2
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From the Figure 21 we can say that we could separate the malware and benign
test files scores.
6.3 AUC statistics
Tables in the previous section contains values for only one singular vector con-
sidered in the implementation. Tables 6, 7, 8 and 9 contains AUC values for two
and three singular vectors considered in the experiment. The comparison shows tells
that it is always preferrable to consider only first singular vector when there is a huge
difference between eigenvalues.
The Table 6 shows the average AUC values for G2 and NGVCK malware families
when first two singular vectors are considered in the technique for generating the
eigenspace.
Table 6: NGVCK and G2 AUC values using two eigenvectors
Malware AUC
G2 0.7012
NGVCK 0.915578
If we compare the AUC values of G2 and NGVCK in the Table 6 with the values
in Table 6 we notice that the AUC values drop for both G2 and NGVCK which
indicates that more number of false positives are identified if we consider first two
singular vectors for generating the eigenspace.
For MWOR families also the AUC values decreased with two singular vectors.
But we observed that as the padding ratio increased the AUC values didnot drop.The
values in the Tables above represents the average of the AUC values for all the five
sets.
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Table 7: MWOR AUC values using two Eigenvectors
Malware AUC
MWOR_1.0 0.78965
MWOR_1.5 0.79961
MWOR_2.0 0.81975
MWOR_2.5 0.83083
MWOR_3.0 0.84405
MWOR_4.0 0.86579
The Tables 8, 9 shows the AUC values when first three singular vectors are
considered in the technique. The values for G2 and NGVCK in the Table 8 shows
that there is a drop in AUC value when compared with values generated by two
singular vectors.
Table 8: NGVCK and G2 AUC values using three Eigenvectors
Malware AUC
G2 0.69592
NGVCK 0.90282
We notice that there is a drop in the AUC values for all the malware families
when we consider two eigenvectors and three eigenvectors for projecting the mal-
ware replicates on to the eigenspace. This concludes that considering the first few
eigenvectors with more eigenvalue achieves best results.
Similarly we did experiments on malware family by considering first three eigen-
vectors and we noticed a drop in the AUC value when compared with first eigenvecor.
Table 9 represents the scores for all the mwor families with different padding ratios
when first three eigenvectors are considered for scoring.
38
Table 9: MWOR AUC values using three Eigenvectors
Malware AUC
MWOR_1.0 0.76733
MWOR_1.5 0.72837
MWOR_2.0 0.75133
MWOR_2.5 0.77488
MWOR_3.0 0.79521
MWOR_4.0 0.8148
From the above AUC values for all the malware familes tested we observe that
if we consider more singular vectors in generating the eigenspace more false positives
are identified. The reason is that if we consider more eigenvectors there could be a
probable chance of considering noise for finding the scores. So first singularvector
with high singularvalue gives the best trained output.
6.4 Compiler Datasets
We implemented SVD technique to classify compiler datasets. We trained one
compiler dataset files and then tested other compiler dataset executables against the
trained dataset to check if SVD can classify the files correctly. Experiments have
been done on windows and linux compiler datasets. Turobc and Mingw are windows
compiler datasets, Gcc and Clang are linux compiler datasets. Following are the AUC
values obtained for the compiler datasets:
Table 10: Turboc scores against different compiler datasets
Num of Eigenvalues 1 2 3
clang 0.70335 0.67431 0.64402
mingw 0.60605 0.59699 0.57555
gcc 0.71831 0.69158 0.66182
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Table 11: Clang scores against different compiler datasets
Num of Eigenvalues 1 2 3
turboc 0.60785 0.69871 0.73016
mingw 0.65196 0.72682 0.74319
gcc 0.50735 0.50381 0.4983
Table 12: Mingw scores against different compiler datasets
Num of Eigenvalues 1 2 3
clang 0.65687 0.54935 0.55955
turboc 0.5291 0.51023 0.50782
gcc 0.6716 0.57611 0.59054
Table 13: Gcc scores against different compiler datasets
Num of Eigenvalues 1 2 3
clang 0.52535 0.52359 0.52221
turbo 0.70485 0.7351 0.74377
mingw 0.69823 0.74984 0.71789
We infer that the scores for the compiler datasets are not good. Compiler datasets
vary structurally a lot thought they remain statistically same, which is the reason for
bad scores. Also for the training phase we considered different programs which have
different functionality. Incase of malware files all the training dataset files have same
functionality. Hidden Markov Model is a statistical approach and this technique
would give good results in classifying the compiler datasets.
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusion and Future Work
Many detection techniques have been proposed in the past to detect highly meta-
morphic malware. One of the techniques to detect the malware family using eigen-
values has been proposed in the paper [22]. The paper considered virus replicates
of different malware families in the training data set. In our implementation we
implemented singular value decomposition which is more similar to the eigenvalues
technique. Here we considered virus replicates of a particular malware family in the
training phase instead of considering different malware families virus replicates in
the training phase. This assumption tells that all the virus replicates in the training
phase will be of almost same size which is not the case in the eigenvalue decomposition
technique. Also we implemented this technique on classifying the compiler datasets
which is not done in previous implementations.
Our technique SVD worked well in detecting the highly metamorphic malware
families NGCK, MWOR and also G2. Though the technique generates many singular
vectors our technique showed good results for just first singular vector. In fact we did
experiments using first two and three singular vectors for all the malware families but
we observed that the score for malware and benign test files are almost converging
except for NGVCK. So we conclude that first singular vector alone will give better
results if there is huge difference between the eigenvalues of the first eigenvector and
the rest of the eigenvectors.
This technique is very fast and efficient and it can be implemented along with
traditional detection techniques that are present in current antivirus products.
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We implemented this approach on only three malware families and the results
obtained are satisfactory. As part of future work it is good to see how the technique
works on other malware families like W95/Zmist, W95/Zperm or W95/Bistro.
Other techniques which works on the data points and vectors like Lattice Red-
cution and Fisherface recognition can be implemented on the raw bytes to see its
effectiveness. It is said that in case of eigenvectors some information might be lost
while throwing away the eigenvectors [6]. So Fisherfaces technique can be imple-
mented to see its effectiveness in detecting the malware. Another scoring technique
like Mahabalonis Distance can be implemented which takes into account the correla-
tion of the data set and also its scale-invariant.
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